This paper focuses on the question how much evidence one should collect before deciding on the truth-value of a proposition. An analysis is given of a model where evidence takes the form of Bernoullidistributed random variables. From a Bayesian perspective, the optimal strategy depends on the potential loss of drawing the wrong conclusion about the proposition and the cost of collecting evidence. It turns out to be best to collect only small amounts of evidence unless the potential loss is very large relative to the cost of collecting evidence.
Introduction
Suppose a scientist wants to learn the truth-value of some proposition. Perhaps because some important decision depends on it, perhaps just because she wants to know. She can gather evidence, but no collection of evidence conclusively settles the truth-value of the proposition. Gathering evidence is costly: it requires time and effort, which could be spent on other pursuits.
How much evidence should the scientist collect in such a scenario? Or in other words, how should the benefits of more evidence be traded off against the costs? This paper analyzes a model where the evidence takes the form of Bernoulli trials and finds the optimal Bayesian strategy for this model. The decision to believe that p is true (and to act on that belief when appropriate), and d 2 represents the decision to believe that p is false.
The scientist is faced with a trade-off. Collecting more evidence reduces the chance of drawing the wrong conclusion about the truth-value of p, but increases the accumulated costs. Collecting less evidence reduces the costs, but increases the chance of drawing the wrong conclusion about p.
In order to mathematically analyze this trade-off, I need some additional assumptions about the way individual scientists make decisions. I assume scientists act as if they were Bayesian statisticians. This means that their decisions can be modeled as follows.
First, at any given time the scientist has a subjective probability ξ ∈ [0, 1] that reflects how likely she thinks it is that p is true. Second, in response to evidence she updates these beliefs using Bayes' rule. Third, the scientist has a loss function that puts a numerical value on each decision in each possible world. Fourth, the scientist makes decisions that minimize risk, which is the expected value of the loss relative to her subjective beliefs.
In this model, the loss is zero if the decision is "correct" (d 1 if p and d 2 if ¬p), and β > 0 if the decision is "incorrect" (d 2 if p and d 1 if ¬p, see table 1). The total loss is then plus the number of connections made times c. As a result, the risk associated with decision d 1 is (1 − ξ)β and the risk associated with decision d 2 is ξβ. By assumption, the scientist chooses the decision with the lowest risk, so the risk associated with the decision is ρ 0 (ξ) := min{ξβ, (1 − ξ)β}.
It remains to ask how much evidence the scientist will collect. This is a sequential sampling problem. The scientist wants to learn the true state of the world, which she can do by sampling at a cost c from a probability distribution that depends on the state of the world. Let ∆ denote the set of all possible sequential decision procedures the scientist might use. So each δ ∈ ∆ is a function that specifies whether the scientist collects an additional piece of evidence as a function of the evidence obtained so far.
Let X i denote the i-th piece of evidence. Let ξ(X 1 , . . . , X n ) denote the posterior probability that p is true after seeing X 1 , . . . , X n (assuming the prior was ξ). Let N (δ) denote the number of connections made under sequential decision procedure δ ∈ ∆ (in general, this is a random variable). Then the risk of a sequential decision procedure δ ∈ ∆ is
By assumption the scientist chooses the procedure with the lowest risk, i.e., the procedure δ * ∈ ∆ that satisfies
The existence of a procedure δ * that satisfies this equation is guaranteed by Chow and Robbins (1963, theorem 1) . The next section is dedicated to specifying δ * .
The Results
The problem that the scientist needs to solve is that of finding an optimal stopping rule. DeGroot (2004, sections 12.14-12.16 ) provides an analysis of this situation. Let ξ denote the scientist's prior before seeing any evidence and let c > 0 be the cost of one observation. The observations are i.i.d. with distribution
if p is true, and
if p is false. Let
Consider the sequential decision procedure δ(a, b) that continues to take observations as long as (2004)). Suppose the random variables Z i can only take the values z and −z for some z and a and b are integer multiples of z. Then the risk of the sequential decision procedure δ(a, b) is
and the optimal sequential decision procedure among those that take at least one observation is δ(a * , b * ) where a * < 0 and b * > 0 are the values that minimize (1).
So the optimal sequential decision procedure in the decision problem under consideration (assuming at least one observation is taken) takes the form
where m and n are positive integers. The scientist considers the difference between the number of X i so far observed that took the value zero and the number of X i so far observed that took the value one. The procedure then tells her to continue to take observations as long as that difference is strictly between −m and n. If the difference hits −m she stops taking observations and chooses decision d 1 , and if the difference hits n she stops and chooses decision d 2 . Let g k be defined by
for all non-negative integers k and ε ∈ (0, 1/2). Since g k+1 (ε) > g k (ε) for all k and ε, there is a unique k * such that
(Unless β/c ≤ g 0 (ε); in that case define k * = 0. See also tabel 2) Proposition 2. If ξ = 1/2, the optimal sequential decision procedure is
This proposition determines the optimal procedure for a scientist who starts out thinking p is equally likely to be true or false. What if the scientist has a different prior?
. . . . . . Table 2 : k * is determined by finding an interval of the form (
such that β/c is in that interval.
Corollary 4. For any ξ ∈ (0, 1) not covered by proposition 3 there must be a d ∈ Z such that
Then the optimal sequential decision procedure is one of
One can derive general inequalities to determine which of these four procedures is optimal for given values of ξ, β, c, and ε, but this is not important for my purposes here.
What proposition 3 and its corollary show is that in general a larger value of k * indicates that more observations will be needed to come to a decision on the truth-value of p. The value of ξ biases the process towards one conclusion or the other but it does not change this general level k * . I will focus on the value of k * in the remainder of this paper.
Discussion
In the previous section I identified k * as a function of the parameters β, c, and ε (see figure 1) . If the prior is ξ = 1/2, the optimal sequential decision procedure may be characterized straightforwardly in terms of k * (if ξ = 1/2, this characterization holds except for a bias towards one conclusion or the other).
Where k * = 0, the optimal procedure is to take no observations. Where k * = 1, the optimal procedure is to take exactly one observation. Where k * > 1, the optimal procedure is to take observations until the absolute difference between the number of observed X i that take the value one and the number that take the value zero is k * .
k 10 How does k * respond to changes in the parameter values? Consider a change along the vertical axis of figure 1. All else being equal, if β increases the scientist takes more observations before making a decision. This is reasonable, because an increase of β means that coming to the wrong conclusion gives a higher loss, and taking more observations helps decrease the chance of that. Conversely, if c increases the scientist takes less observations before making a decision (all else being equal). This is also reasonable, because increased costs of observations give the scientist an incentive to come to a decision quickly, even if this increases the chance of making the wrong decision. Now consider a change in the reliability of the evidence (the horizontal axis of figure 1). In the limit as ε goes to 1/2, k * decreases to the point where it is optimal to take no observations at all. This is because at such a high value of ε, observations provide no meaningful information: the two possible outcomes are almost equally likely in either of the two possible worlds. Given that nothing is learned from them anyway, it is unreasonable to pay any cost to see the value of these random variables, no matter the value of c. This is why g k (ε) goes to infinity as ε goes to 1/2 (for any k).
In the limit as ε goes to 0, it is optimal to take at most one observation. At such a low value of ε, one observation is enough for the scientist to learn which world she is in with near-certainty. So whatever the value of c, there is no point in paying it more than once. The only question is whether one or zero observations should be taken. This question is equivalent to asking whether the cost to the scientist of guessing which world she is in (with a 1/2 chance of being correct, this cost is β/2) or the cost of the one observation needed to learn which world she is in (i.e., c) is lower. Clearly, taking one observation is better if β/c > 2, while taking no observations is better if β/c < 2. In accordance with this result, g 0 (ε) goes to 2 as ε goes to 0, while g k (ε) goes to infinity for all k > 0.
For moderate values of ε, there is some more interesting behavior. As long as ε is not too close to its limits, the value of β/c actually matters. At values of β/c greater than 13.7, more complicated decision procedures than "decide immediately" or "take one observation and then decide" start appearing. Noting that the vertical axis in figure 1 is logarithmic, it is worth mentioning that quite large values of β/c are needed before procedures that wait for a larger difference than a few between the number of observations favoring p's truth and p's falsity come into the picture. For instance, if β/c ≤ 100, it is never optimal to wait for a larger difference than 4, whatever the value of ε.
Conclusion
I analyzed a model of a scientist trying to learn the truth-value of a proposition by observing evidence in the form of Bernoulli-distributed random variables. I asked and answered the question how much evidence a Bayesian scientist should want to see, given that each observation comes at a cost c, and the loss for an incorrect conclusion is β.
Qualitatively, the results are as expected. A higher loss β or a lower cost c leads to a higher number of observations, and vice versa.
Quantitatively, the results are perhaps a little more surprising. If the loss is no higher than the cost of thirteen observations (β ≤ 13c) then it is optimal to take no more than one observation. Even if the loss is as high as the cost of a hundred observations it is not optimal to wait for a difference larger than four between the number of observations favoring one conclusion and the number of observations favoring the other.
This suggests that only the most important propositions (where the results of having the wrong belief about it are many times worse than the costs of collecting additional evidence) merit extensive investigation. For less important propositions collecting a single piece of evidence (or simply guessing the truth-value based on no evidence at all) is often the best strategy.
The model used here lends itself to extension in various respects. It might be interesting to use different distributions for the evidence and compare the results with the case analyzed here. Such variations would remain within the basic framework of the sequential probability-ratio test and could thus be analyzed on similar lines. Less straightforward extensions might consider more complicated problems (e.g., learning about multiple propositions) and different forms of the loss function.
A Proofs
From proposition 1 it follows that the optimal procedure that takes at least one observation takes the form δ(a, b), where a is a negative integer multiple of log 1−ε ε and b is a positive integer multiple of log 1−ε ε . If ξ = 1/2, the symmetry of the problem (the loss for a wrong decision β and the cost per observation c are the same whether p is true or false) implies that a = −b. So the optimal procedure that takes at least one observation is of the form
for some positive integer k. Note also that
Next I apply equation (1) to δ k,k , plugging in the expected values of Z i , and using some algebra to simplify the resulting expression. This yields
. Now I can compare the risk of different procedures, for example δ k,k and δ k+1,k+1 . This way I find
For a given value of ε, g k+1 (ε) > g k (ε) for all k ≥ 0 because:
So there is a unique positive integer k * such that
(Unless β/c ≤ g 1 (ε); in that case set k * = 1.) Moreover, δ k * ,k * is the optimal sequential decision procedure that takes at least one observation:
for all positive integers k (with equality only if either k = k * or β/c = g k * (ε) and k = k * + 1).
So far, I have focused on determining an optimal procedure under the assumption that at least one observation is taken. It remains to be determined whether ρ(1/2, k * , k * ) < ρ 0 (1/2), that is whether the optimal procedure that takes at least one observation is better than taking no observations at all. First consider whether taking one observation is better than taking none. Since
it follows that ρ(1/2, 1, 1) < ρ 0 (1/2) if and only if
It turns out that the criterion is exactly β/c > g 0 (ε). So if taking zero observations is better than taking one observation β/c ≤ g 0 (ε) < g k (ε) for all k > 0, so in that case taking zero observations is better than taking any number of observations. So I can simply extend the definition of k * to be the unique positive integer such that
unless β/c ≤ g 0 (ε), in which case k * is defined to be zero. The optimal sequential decision procedure when the prior is 1/2 is δ k * ,k * . This proves proposition 2. Now consider a prior of the form
This might be called a conjugate prior for this decision problem since conditioning on evidence yields posterior probabilities of the same form: ξ d (1) = ξ d−1 and ξ d (0) = ξ d+1 (recall that ξ(x) denotes the result of using Bayes' rule with prior ξ and evidence X 1 = x).
Note that ξ 0 = 1/2 so the optimal sequential decision procedure for ξ 0 is δ k * ,k * . But in light of the above that means that it is optimal to continue taking observations as long as the posterior is between ξ k * and ξ −k * , to stop and choose decision d 2 if the posterior hits ξ k * , and to stop and choose decision d 1 if the posterior hits ξ −k * .
These optimal stopping points do not depend on the prior. Thus for any prior ξ d it is optimal to continue taking observations as long as the posterior remains between ξ k * and ξ −k * . But this is exactly the sequential decision procedure δ k * +d,k * −d (assuming ξ k * < ξ d < ξ −k * , i.e., k * + d > 0 and k * − d > 0, otherwise it is optimal to decide immediately). This proves proposition 3. If ξ d < ξ < ξ d−1 then observing X i = 0 k * −d+1 times forces the posterior to be less than ξ k * , at which point it is optimal to stop taking observations.
Observing X i = 0 less than k * − d times forces the posterior to be larger than ξ k * −1 , so continuing to take observations is optimal. Similarly, observing X i = 1 k * + d times forces the posterior to be greater than ξ −k * , at which point it is optimal to stop taking observations. Observing X i = 1 less than k * + d − 1 times forces the posterior to be less than ξ −k * +1 , so continuing to take observations is optimal. Hence one of δ k * +d,k * −d , δ k * +d−1,k * −d+1 , δ k * +d−1,k * −d , or δ k * +d,k * −d+1 is the optimal sequential decision procedure. This proves the corollary.
